From Global Value Chains to Strategic Autonomy: The Limit of Interdependence in the US-China Semiconductor Rivalry

Budi Riyanto, Revy Marlina

Abstract


This research will explore the competition between China and the US, specifically in the context of chip war. The chip war highlights the importance of understanding the dynamics of economic interdependence in international relations. In this case, the chip war is not simply a matter of economic competition over market share but rather is part of a broader strategic competition between the US and China. The increasing reliance on technology in areas such as supply chain management, cyber warfare, and military hardware has significantly elevated its importance in contemporary  international  relations.  Technological  leadership  and  control  over  key technologies become a crucial geopolitical factor, particularly in areas such as trade, diplomacy, and security. Meanwhile, technology has led to new opportunities between the countries to create cooperation, China and The US see this as a new tool for political coercion or influence. This research will analyze China’s strategy to face The US in the context of the chip war since The US itself sees the rapid technological development of China as a challenge. The paper analyzes the factors driving this competition, including technological supremacy, national security concerns, and economic nationalism. It explores the implications of the chip war for global supply chains, geopolitical stability, and the future of technological innovation. By examining the case of the chip war, the paper challenges the traditional assumption that economic interdependence inevitably leads to peace and cooperation.


Keywords: The Chip War, The US-China strategic competition, interdependence, technology


Keywords


The Chip War, The US-China strategic competition, interdependence, technology

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.33021/aegis.v8i1.5462

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.