

PROMOTING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: SECURING EUROPEAN IDENTITY POST COLD WAR

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Abstrak

Pada 13 November 2013, sekelompok terorisme lancarkan serangan yang terkoordinasi di beberapa tempat umum di Paris, diikuti oleh serangan bom kembar di Belgia tanggal 22 Maret 2016. Beberapa pihak di antaranya menyebutkan kejadian di Perancis adalah yang kekerasan terburuk sejak berlangsungnya Perang Dunia kedua (1939-1945), sebagian menggambarkan kejadian serangan teroris tersebut merupakan serangan terburuk dalam sejarah. Ini bias jadi terlalu di besar-besarkan atau hysteria semata. Namun kejadian 13 November dan 22 Maret telah memicu persoalan ini menjadi rumit sehingga menimbulkan krisis identitas Eropa. Penulis berusaha untuk mempertanyakan dan menjelaskan dampak integrasi Eropa terhadap identitas Eropa dalam riset deskriptif analitis, dimana terdapat 4 (empat) isu strategis yang muncul sebagai kepedulian para pengambil keputusan di Eropa, yaitu: Pertama, bagaimana negara-negara Eropa berubah posisinya menghadapi isu migrant dan pengungsi dari wilayah konflik di Timur Tengah?; Kedua, apakah ada kemampuan negara Islam untuk memperluas pengaruhnya ? Apa saja kelebihan dan kelemahannya; Ketiga, opsi yang dimiliki Paris dan Brussel dalam penyelesaian masalah yaitu Perancis yang tetap melancarkan serangan di Suriah, dan bagaimana hasil Perundingan dapat menyelesaikan konflik? Keempat, bagaimana masa depan Perjanjian Schengen terhadap integrasi Eropa atau disintegrasi Eropa? Bagaimanapun, proses integrasi Eropa menarik untuk dipelajari, seperti hal mencoba untuk meramalkan apa yang akan terjadi di masa yang akan datang.

Kata kunci: *identitas, kepentinganannasional, migran, integrasi*

Abstract

On November 13, 2015 a handful of terrorists unleashed a barrage of coordinated attacks at public gathering spots in Paris, France, followed by Belgium twin bombings on 22 March 2016. As the casualty figures climbed and investigators swung into action, news reports were filled with grim comparisons. Some calling it the worst night of violence in France since World War II (1939-1945), and others saying it could be Europe's most horrific terrorist attack in history. Cutting past any hysteria or hyperbole, it is clear that the Nov. 13 and March 22 attacks have brought to a head the conversation on a number of difficult, overlapping questions facing both Europe and the Middle East. It raised critical European identity. The writer attempt to examine European integration impacts on its identity in descriptive analytical research, and founded that, it might be triggered 4 (four) main strategic issues surrounding the European decision makers, including: First, how might European states shift their stance toward the influx of migrants and refugees coming from war zones in

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the Middle East?; Second, are the capabilities of the Islamic State truly expanding, as recent claims suggest? What are its actual strengths and weaknesses?; Third, what options did Paris and Brussels have in responding to the attacks? As France steps up the tempo of airstrikes in Syria, will the Vienna talks on Syria's conflict be radically reshaped?; Fourth, what does the future hold for the Schengen Agreement, and would its unraveling lead the European Union itself closer to dissolution? However, still attractive for those scholars who want to elaborate the European integration progress, as how to predict what's likely to happen next.

Keywords: identity, national interests, migrants, integration

INTRODUCTION

The idea that Europe was not going to emerge as one united political entity was regarded as heresy by many leaders. The European enterprise was seen as a work in progress moving inevitably toward unification, a group of nations committed to a common fate. What was a core vision in 2008 is now gone. What was inconceivable, the primacy of the traditional nation-state, is now commonly discussed and steps to devolve Europe in part or in whole, such as ejecting Greece from the Eurozone, are being contemplated. This is not a trivial event.

Based on document on the European identity published by the Nine Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1973, in Copenhagen, in defining involves: *First*, to review the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community; *Second*, to assess the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this; *Third*, to take into consideration the dynamic nature of the European unification.

Nine countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe.

Before 1492, Europe was a backwater of small nationalities struggling over a relatively small piece of cold, rainy land. But one technological change made Europe the center of the international system: deep-water navigation.

The ability to engage in long-range shipping safely allowed businesses on the continent's various navigable rivers to interact easily with each other, magnifying the rivers' capital-generation capacity. Deep-water navigation also allowed many of the European nations to conquer vast extra-European empires. The close proximity of those nations combined with ever more wealth allowed for technological innovation and advancement at a pace theretofore unheard of anywhere on the planet. As a whole, Europe became very rich, became engaged in very far-flung empire-building that redefined the human condition and became very good at making war. In short order, Europe went from being a cultural and economic backwater to being the engine of the world. At home, Europe's growing economic development was exceeded only by the growing ferocity of its conflicts. Abroad, Europe had achieved the ability to apply military force to achieve economic aims, and vice versa.

European IR transformed by a series of social, economic and political changes which have created a qualitatively new situation. Hence the problems facing policy-makers in Europe today are, in a number of important respects, qualitatively different from the problems of the past².

European System

The tensions underlying Europe were brought to a head by German unification in 1871 and the need to accommodate Germany in the European system, of which Germany was both an integral and indigestible part. The result was two catastrophic general wars in Europe that began in 1914 and ended in 1945 with the occupation of Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union and the collapse of the European imperial system. Its economy shattered and its public plunged into a crisis of morale and a lack of confidence in the elites. Europe had neither the interest in nor appetite for empire.

Europe was exhausted not only by war but also by the internal psychosis of two of its major components. Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union might well have externally behaved according to predictable laws of geopolitics. Internally, these two countries went mad, slaughtering both their own citizens and citizens of countries they occupied for reasons

² Manurung, Hendra. (2014). *“Impacts of the European Union Eastern Partnership on Eurasia Future”*. 3rd Convention of European Studies at University of Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 21-23 May 2014.

that were barely comprehensible, let alone rationally explicable. From my point of view, the pressure and slaughter inflicted by two world wars on both countries created a collective mental breakdown.

However, the writer realizes this is a woefully inadequate answer. But consider Europe after World War II. First, it had gone through about 450 years of global adventure and increasingly murderous wars, in the end squandering everything it had won. Internally, Europe watched a country like Germany, in some ways the highest expression of European civilization, plunge to levels of unprecedented barbarism.

Finally, Europe saw the United States move from the edges of history to assume the role of an occupying force. The United States became the envy of the Europeans: stable, wealthy, unified and able to impose its economic, political and military will on major powers on a different continent. The Russians were part of Europe and could be explained within the European paradigm. So while the Europeans may have disdained the Russians, the Russians were still viewed as poor cousins, part of the family playing by more or less European rules. New and unprecedented, the United States towered over Europe, which went from dominance to psychosis to military, political and cultural subjugation in a twinkling of history's eye.

Paradoxically, it was the United States that gave the first shape to Europe's future, beginning with Western Europe. World War II's outcome brought the United States and Soviet Union to the center of Germany, dividing it. A new war was possible, and the reality and risks of the Cold War were obvious. The United States needed a united Western Europe to contain the Soviets. It created NATO to integrate Europe and the United States politically and militarily.

This created the principle of transnational organizations integrating Europe. The United States also encouraged economic cooperation both within Europe and between North America and Europe, in stark contrast to the mercantilist imperium of recent history, which giving rise to the European Union's precursors. Over the decades of the Cold War, the Europeans committed themselves to a transnational project to create a united Europe of some sort in a way not fully defined.

There were two reasons for unification. The first was the Cold War (1945-1990), and collective defense (post 1990). But the deeper reason was a hope for a European resurrection

from the horrors of the 20th century. It was understood that German unification in 1871 created the conflicts and that the division of Germany in 1945 re-stabilized Europe. At the same time, Europe did not want to remain occupied or caught in an ongoing near-war situation. The Europeans were searching for a way to overcome their history.

One problem was the status of Germany. The deeper problem was Nationalism. Not only had Europe failed to unite under a single flag via conquest but also World War I had shattered the major empires, creating a series of smaller states that had been fighting to be free. The argument was that it was nationalism, and not just German nationalism, that had created the 20th century. Europe's task was therefore to overcome nationalism and create a structure in which Europe united and retained unique nations as cultural phenomena and not political or economic entities. At the same time, by embedding Germany in this process, the German problem would be solved as well.

In his latest novel, French writer Michel Houellebecq presents a controversial situation: The year is 2022, and France has become an Islamized country where universities have to teach the Koran, women have to wear the veil and polygamy is legal. The book, which created a stir in France, went on sale January 7, 2015. That day, a group of terrorists killed 12 people at the headquarters of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo.

On January 7, 2015 German Chancellor Angela Merkel met British Prime Minister David Cameron in London, U.K. Although the formal reason for the meeting was to discuss the upcoming G-7 summit, the two leaders also discussed Cameron's proposals to limit migration in European continent. Finally, a much less publicized event took place in Germany that day: A group of politicians from the Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany party met with members of Pegida, the anti-Islam protest group that has staged large protests in Dresden and minor protests in other German cities.

The date of these four episodes is only a coincidence, but the issues involved are not. A growing number of Europeans believe that people from other cultures are threatening their national identities and livelihoods. The emergence of Germany's Pegida movement, which opposes the "Islamization" of Germany, the terrorist attack in Paris and the recent attacks against mosques in Sweden put the focus on Muslims. But the Europeans' fear and mistrust of "foreigners" is a much broader phenomenon that goes beyond the issue of Islam-related violence. What is actually happening is that Europe is rediscovering nationalism.

Since September 2008, Europe is in crisis. It has been in crisis for seven years, and while its inhabitants continue to calmly go about their daily lives it is sometimes easy to lose sight of the fact that behind the scenes, the joints and hinges that hold the Continent together are under great stress. In 2008, the global financial crisis put an end to the dream of everlasting prosperity, and 2011 saw the arrival of financial panic on Europe's shores, which was a panic, has continued its disruptive work in Greece for much.

European Integration

From IR's perspective, conservatism came into being in the late 18th century as a reaction to the political projects of the early Liberals and as an intellectual response on the part of the old elites to the bid for power from the growing bourgeoisie. As original system conservatism is first mentioned in Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, a meditation on the French Revolution published in 1790. It was not until 25 years later, however, that the word would be used as a term by those who supported the restoration of the Bourbons, including François-René de Chateaubriand. Fifteen years after that, in 1830, John Wilson Croker first referred to the British Tories as Conservatives.

Therefore, conservatism, proceeding from an organic interpretation of society, gives preference to political institutions and practices that have resulted from gradual development and embody stability and continuity. Like any ideology, conservatism is a system of interconnected interpretations of political concepts: traditions, authority, liberty, justice, etc. Very diverse political forces have called themselves, or have been labeled, conservatives. They range from the Christian democrats in Italy and Germany to right-wing radical and neo-conservatives in the United States. The emphasis in different movements may differ, but abiding features of conservatism are almost always its pessimistic view of human nature, a commitment to tradition as a way to ward off revolutions, the treatment of inequality as an indispensable condition of diversity and freedom, and the special role of authority.

In the longer term, conservatism may play a role especially in Europe, as an answer to the challenges posed by immigration, the identity crisis, and uncontrolled development of technologies. By 2080, the population of the European Union is projected to reach 520 million, of which almost a quarter, which is more than 120 million will practice Islam. By 2030, 10 per cent of the population of France and Belgium will be Muslim. And these figures

are only likely to grow, considering the flood of refugees that has overwhelmed the Old World in 2015.

Immigration policy already worries EU citizens more than any other problem. It is also the chief national concern in Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom. In addition to the obvious negative impact on the education system and the inevitable cultural and civilizational tensions that will arise, the high rate of immigration prompts fears about the future of the welfare state as an idea. The high level of social guarantees in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Scandinavian countries highlights the division between “us” and “them”. Europeans are genuinely concerned about why their taxes should go to pay child benefits for people who come from countries on the other side of the Mediterranean. Reducing the amount that they receive in benefits themselves is not seen as an option.

Thus, the rhetoric of Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom, has veered to the left, calling for a reduction in the number of Moroccans in the Netherlands and criticizing plans to cut spending on healthcare.

In this context, conservatism and some of its elements will be in great demand. The political establishment will have to react to the challenges of immigration. It is impossible to solve the problem of the growing number of EU residents born outside Europe without radical, and indeed restrictive, measures. Conservatism, probably unlike other ideologies, has a conceptual toolkit that is far more suitable for the purpose.

First, while liberalism which follows the Neo-Platonists and Humanists, and socialism which puts its faith in social programming believe in the evolution of humankind, conservatism highlights human passions, selfishness and greed. The first approach to human nature does not sit well with the need to limit the entry of immigrants or deport them because, after all, they have good intentions and will help Europe to develop, especially after they change under the influence of their new home. The pessimistic view sees a potential threat in every new arrival.

Second, the conservative interpretation of freedom and the attitude to the issue of equality provide a potent argument for the need to distinguish, including in legal terms, the status of citizens and the position of immigrants. In *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Edmund Burke stresses that liberties are the “entailed inheritance derived to us from our

forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity, as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom”.

The conservative critique of equality can be transferred from society’s inner structure to building a case for inequality between citizens and immigrants as the necessary condition for preserving the level of freedoms and social guarantees those generations of Europeans have achieved through hard work and which seekers of a better life would like to enjoy by simply arriving here. The rising tide of immigration makes classical conservative ideas more attractive.

What Europe has to offer is, of course, a common heritage, only the shares sold out many years ago. Changes in the ethnic and religious composition of the population are making a substantial difference to the political reality in the United States. The process described in the American political discourse as “*the browning of America*”³, leads the white population to rally in support of traditionally conservative values. On the one hand, this strengthens, in the long term, the positions of the Republican Party and increases conservative rhetoric in the party’s agenda. On the other hand, in a country where [white people will be a minority](#) as early as 2043, the majority of voters will be attracted by entirely different ideological constructs.

Europe, which includes 50 countries and territories, has about 38 million Muslims, constituting about 5% of its population. European Muslims make up slightly more than 2% of the world’s Muslim population.

It is quite difficult to bear in mind that estimates of the numbers of Muslims in European continent vary widely because of the difficulty of counting new immigrants. Nevertheless, it is clear that most European Muslims live in eastern and central Europe. The country with the largest Muslim population in Europe is Russia, with more than 16 million Muslims, meaning that more than four-in-ten European Muslims live in Russia. While most Muslims in western Europe are relatively recent immigrants, and or children of immigrants from Turkey, North Africa or South Asia, most of those in Russia, Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria belong to populations that are centuries old, meaning that more than six-in-ten European Muslims are indigenous.

³ <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/04/the-rising-democratic-majority-doomed.html>

Despite the limitations of the underlying data for Europe, it appears that Germany is home to more than 4 million Muslims, which is almost as many as the North and South America combined. This means that Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon, which is between 2 million and 3 million, and more than any other country in Western Europe. This also puts Germany among the “Top 10” countries with the largest number of Muslims living as a minority population. While France has a slightly higher percentage of Muslims than Germany, this study finds that it has slightly fewer Muslims overall⁴. The United Kingdom is home to fewer than 2 million Muslims, about 3% of its total population.

Table 1 Muslims Population in Europe

	Estimated 2009 Muslim Population	Percentage of Population that is Muslim	Percentage of World Muslim Population
Russia	16,482,000	11.7%	1.0%
Germany*	4,026,000	~5	<1
France*	3,554,000	~6	<1
Albania	2,522,000	79.9	0.2
Kosovo	1,999,000	89.6	0.1
United Kingdom	1,647,000	2.7	0.1
Bosnia-Herzegovina*	1,522,000	~40	<1
Netherlands	946,000	5.7	0.1
Bulgaria	920,000	12.2	0.1
Republic of Macedonia	680,000	33.3	<0.1
Rest of Region	3,814,000	1.1	0.2
Regional Total	38,112,000	5.2	2.4
World Total	1,571,198,000	22.9	100.0

* Data for Germany, France and Bosnia-Herzegovina come primarily from general population surveys, which are less reliable than censuses or large-scale demographic and health surveys for estimating minority-majority ratios (see Methodology). As a result, the percentage of the population that is Muslim in these three countries is rounded to the nearest integer. Note: Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding.

Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim Population, October 2009


The European countries with the highest concentration of Muslims are located in eastern and central Europe: Kosovo (90%), Albania (80%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (40%) and Republic of Macedonia (33%). Greece is about 3% Muslim, while Spain is about 1%

⁴ The France's Muslim population is between 3 million and 4 million based on recent immigrant data and a 2005 Generations and Gender Survey (2009). Other sources, including the U.S. State Department, CIA World Fact Book, World Religion Database and general population surveys, have variously estimated the Muslim population of France at between 2.5 million and 6 million.

Muslim. Italy has one of the smallest populations of Muslims in Europe, with less than 1% of its population being Muslim.

In European continent, the number of Muslims has grown from 29.6 million in 1990 to 44.1 million in 2010. Europe’s Muslim population is projected to exceed 58 million by 2030. Muslims today account for about 6% of Europe’s total population, up from 4.1% in 1990.

Table 2 The Muslims Population in Europe, 1990-2030



By 2030, Muslims are expected to make up 8% of Europe’s population. Although Europe’s Muslim population is growing, Europe’s share of the global Muslim population will remain quite small. Less than 3% of the world’s Muslims are expected to be living in Europe in 2030, about the same portion as in 2010 (2.7%)⁵.

The Survival of EU

⁵ Figures for Italy come from the 2004 European Social Survey. Similar estimates were found in other general population surveys, including the 2002 and 2007 Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Projects surveys. However, other sources have variously estimated Italy’s Muslim population at between 30,000 and 1.5 million.

During the generation of prosperity between the early 1990s and 2008, the question of European identity and national identity really did not arise. Being a European was completely compatible with being a Greek. Prosperity meant there was no choice to make. Economic crisis meant that choices had to be made, between the interests of Europe, the interests of Germany and the interests of Greece, as they were no longer the same. What happened was not a European solution, but a series of national calculations on self-interest; it was a negotiation between foreign countries, not a European solution growing organically from the recognition of a single, shared fate.

Ultimately, Europe was an abstraction. The nation-state was real. We could see this earliest and best not in the economic arena, but in the area of foreign policy and national defense. The Europeans as a whole never managed to develop either. The foreign policies of the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland were quite different and in many ways at odds. And war, even more than economics, is the sphere in which nations endure the greatest pain and risk. None of the European nations was prepared to abandon national sovereignty in this area, meaning no country was prepared to put the bulk of its armed forces under the command of a European government, and nor were they prepared to cooperate in defense matters unless it was in their interest.

The unwillingness of the Europeans to transfer sovereignty in foreign and defense matters to the European Parliament and a European president was the clearest sign that the Europeans had not managed to reconcile European and national identity. Europeans knew that when it came down to it, the nation mattered more than Europe. And that understanding, under the pressure of crisis, has emerged in economics as well. When there is danger, your fate rests with your country.

The European experiment originated as recoil from the ultra-nationalism of the first half of the 20th century. It was intended to solve the problem of war in Europe. But the problem of nationalism is that not only is it more resilient than the solution, it also derives from the deepest impulses of the Enlightenment. The idea of democracy and of national self-determination grew up as part of a single fabric. In taking away national self-determination, the European experiment seemed to be threatening the foundation of modern Europe.

That clearly is not going to happen. There is no European foreign and defense policy, no European army, no European commander in chief. There is not even a common banking

or budgetary policy. Europe will not counterbalance the United States because, in the end, Europeans do not share a common vision of Europe, a common interest in the world or a mutual trust, much less a common conception of exactly what counterbalancing the United States would mean. Each nation wants to control its own fate so as not to be drawn back into the ultra-nationalism of a Germany in the 1930s and 1940s or the indifference to nationalism of the Hapsburg Empire. The Europeans like their nations and want to retain them. After all, the nation is who they actually are.

Pursuing European Integration

Traditionally, the European integration has been a cradle for nationalism. From the romantic nationalism of the 19th century to the totalitarianism of the 20th century, Europeans have long defined themselves by a strong sentiment of national belonging, often linked to language, ethnicity and religion, and distrust of foreigners. The love for the place you were born the trust of the people who surround you, and the fear of what strangers could do to you and your community is a basic human feeling. But in Europe, nationalism is particularly notable for the sheer scale of death and destruction it historically has brought to the continent.

European integration is the process of industrial, political, legal, economic, social and cultural integration of states wholly or partially in Europe. European integration has primarily come about through the European Union (E.U) and its policies. One of the first to conceive of a union of European nations was Count Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove-Kalergi, who wrote the Pan-Europa manifesto in 1923⁶. His ideas influenced Aristide Briand, who gave a speech in favour of a European Union in the League of Nations on 8 September 1929, and who in 1930 wrote a "Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union" for the Government of France⁷, which became the first European government formally to adopt the principle: "*We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only, will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living*" (Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister)⁸.

However, the question of how to avoid wars between the nation-states was essential for the first theories. Federalism and Functionalism proposed the containment of the nation-

⁶ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 21–22

⁷ D. Weigall and P. Stirk, editors, *The Origins and Development of the European Community*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1992, pp. 11–15.

⁸ Churchill, Winston (1946). *Speech to the Academic Youth (Speech)*. Zürich, Switzerland.

state, while transnationalism sought to theorize the conditions for the stabilization of the nation-state system. One of the most influential theories of European integration is neo-functionalism, developed by Ernst B. Haas (1958) and further investigated by Leon Lindberg (1963). The important debate between neo-functionalism and (liberal) inter-governmentalism still remains central in understanding the development and setbacks of the European Union. But as the empirical world has changed, so have the theories and thus the understanding of European Integration. Today there is a relatively new focus on the complex policy-making in the EU and multi-level governance trying to produce a theory of the workings and development of the EU.

Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany in 1951 agreed to confer powers over their steel and coal production to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the Treaty of Paris, which came into force on 23 July 1952. Coal and steel production was essential for the reconstruction of countries in Europe after the 2nd World War and this sector of the national economy had been important for warfare in the 1st and 2nd World Wars. Therefore, France had originally maintained its occupation of the Saarland with its steel companies after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1949.

Thus, by transferring national powers over the coal and steel production to a newly created ECSC Commission, the member states of the ECSC were able to provide for greater transparency and trust among themselves. This transfer of national powers to a Community to be exercised by its Commission was paralleled under the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC) in Brussels.

The Merger Treaty or Brussels Treaty in 1967 combined the institutions of the ECSC and Euratom into that of the EEC. It shared a Parliamentary Assembly and Courts. Collectively they were known as the European Communities (E.C). In 1987, the Single European Act (SEA) was 1st major revision of the Treaty of Rome, formally established the single European market and its political cooperation. It originally had independent personalities although they were increasingly integrated, and over the years were transformed into what is now called the European Union.

The six states that founded 3 Communities were known as the "inner six", the "outer seven" were those countries who formed the European Free Trade Association. These were

Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The 1st enlargement was in 1973, with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Greece joined in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. On 3 October 1990 East Germany and West Germany were reunified, hence East Germany became part of the Community in the new reunified Germany, which was not increasing the number of states.

The European Union (EU) is an association of 28 states that by treaty have delegated certain of their competences to common institutions, in order to coordinate their policies in a number of areas, without however constituting a new state on top of the member states. It was officially established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 upon the foundations of the pre-existing European Economic Community. Thus, 12 states are founding members, namely, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden entered the EU. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007. Croatia acceded in 2013. Official candidate states include Albania, Macedonia⁹, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Morocco's application was rejected by the EEC, Iceland's application is withdrawn by government and Switzerland's is frozen. Norway rejected membership in two referendums.

The institutions of the European Union, its parliamentarians, judges, commissioners and secretariat, the governments of its member states as well as their people, all play a role in European Integration. Nevertheless, the question of who plays the key role is disputed as there are different theories on European Integration focusing on different actors and agency. There are 3 framing issues surrounding European identity integration. Therefore, conscious of the dangers of nationalism, after World War II (1945) Europeans sought to weaken the nation-state, and progressively replace it with the European Union (EU), a grouping of supranational institutions that, over time, were meant to create a supranational European identity. The idea worked for some time, especially at the economic level, where institutions quickly achieved economic integration. But over the past few years, several changes in Europe have exposed the limits of the European integration project.


1. Economic crisis. To a large extent, prosperity was the glue holding the EU together.

During good times, when most people have a job and children are convinced that they

⁹ Officially referred to by the EU and most other European organisations by the provisional appellation "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", due to an ongoing naming dispute.

will have a better life than their parents, the idea of giving up national sovereignty to supranational institutions is easier to accept. But prosperity is no longer a certainty, and many in Europe are beginning to have second thoughts about the benefits of the European project. The economic decline is also leading to a crisis of representation; a growing number of citizens no longer feel represented by mainstream political parties, unions and other traditional institutions.

2. Immigration. The economic crisis is affecting the continent unevenly; countries in northern Europe generally are faring better than those in the south. In addition, the European Union's enlargement in the mid-2000s opened the door for immigration from countries in the former Communist bloc. As a result, countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are dealing with immigration from southern and eastern EU countries. Europe's economic crisis coincides with a deepening of the chronic instability in the Middle East and the Levant. This instability has led to a refugee crisis in Europe as hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers arrive in Europe every year, most of whom are Muslims. In times of economic hardship after 2008 economic crisis, people tend to look for simple answers to complex problems, and "foreigners" are usually the easiest target. It is not a coincidence that the Pegida protests emerged in Saxony, which is one of the German states with the lowest rates of immigration but with some of the highest rates of unemployment. Ethnically and linguistically cohesive areas tend to be less tolerant of people with a different cultural background.
3. Integration. Most European governments operate under the idea that immigration could help the EU mitigate the effects of their shrinking, aging populations. But many countries struggle to fully integrate the newly arrived. Encountering obstacles such as rigid citizenship laws and pervasive cultural barriers, many foreigners find it hard to feel at home in their new countries of residence. In some cases, this situation continues for generations.




According to Samuel Huntington, for a country to take on a new civilization identity it is crucial that “...*the dominant elements in the host civilization, in most cases the West, have to be willing to embrace the convert*”. (Casanova, 2003 Huntington, p. 129). The EU’s indecisiveness regarding Turkey stems from it not yet having made up its mind as to what kind of civilization it wants to aspire towards; one based on a Kantian, cosmopolitan political identity or one based on culture?

Table 3 Terrorist Activity in Europe, 2001-2013

However, there is no fixed end to the process of European integration. The discussion on the possible final political shape or configuration of the European Union is sometimes referred to as the debate on the *finalité politique*, or French for “political purpose”¹⁰.

The European Integration and its enlargement are major issues in the politics of Europe, each at European, national and local level. Integration may conflict with national sovereignty and cultural identity, and is opposed by Eurosceptics. To the east of the EU, the countries of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia have announced their plan to establish the Eurasian Union in year 2015, with some other former Soviet countries possibly joining them.

Table 4 Top 10 EU Countries For Asylum Applicant



Source: *Top 10 EU Countries For Asylum Applicants Per Million Inhabitants, Eurostat, 2013*

Followed by the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EU-MEFTA), based on the Barcelona Process and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). It covers the EU; the EFTA; the EU customs unions with Andorra, San Marino, and Turkey; the EU candidate states; and the

¹⁰ Sarkozy sounds out basis for Mediterranean Union Euractiv.com 16 July 2007. Retrieved on 19 April 2016.

partners of the Barcelona Process. The Union for the Mediterranean is a community of countries, mostly bordering the Mediterranean Sea, established in July 2008¹¹

The identity crisis most countries are facing today will only sharpen in the years to come. Even if we manage to cope with the fears caused by migration and economic crises, we will forever be haunted by Carl Jung's image of man standing "*at the very edge of the world, the abyss of the future before him, above him the heavens, and below him the whole of mankind with a history that disappears in primeval mists*"¹².

The EU initiated a political dialogue on counterterrorism with the United States, Russia, India, Pakistan, Australia, and Japan. In 2005 the EU adopted a counterterrorism strategy composed of four strands: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. The EU was heavily engaged in formulating and adopting the 2005 UN Convention against Nuclear Terrorism and the 2006 UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It encouraged third states to ratify existing UN conventions and protocols¹³.

Conclusion

To be concluded, nationalism is the belief that the fate is bound up with a nation and fellow citizens and people has an indifference to the fate of others. What the Europeanists tried to do was create institutions that made choosing between your own and others unnecessary. But they did this not with martial spirit or European myth, which horrified them. They made the argument prudently: People will like Europe because it will be prosperous, and with all of Europe prosperous there will be no need to choose between your nation and other nations.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² C. Jung. Archetype and Symbol / Compilation and introduction by A.M. Rutkevich. – Moscow, Kanon+ "ROOI "Reabilitatsiya" Publishing House, 2015. p. 217 (in Russian)

¹³ S. Keukeleire and J. MacNaughtan, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (London:Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 227-238

Prosperity comes and goes, and as it sacrifice is needed. And sacrifice, like wealth, is always unevenly distributed. That uneven distribution is determined not only by necessity but also by those who have power and control over institutions. From a national point of view, it is Germany and France that have the power, with the British happy to be out of the main fray. The weak are the rest of Europe, those who surrendered core sovereignty to the Germans and French and now face the burdens of managing sacrifice.

In the end, Europe will remain an enormously prosperous place. The net worth of Europe, still its economic base, its intellectual capital, its organizational capabilities, is stunning. Those qualities do not evaporate. But crisis reshapes how they are managed, operated and distributed. This is now in big question. Obviously, the future of the Euro is now widely discussed.

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