

ECFA and Taiwan from the Perspective of International Law

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Abstract

The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is an important milestone between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan; it is also the most critical achievement in improving the close cross-strait relations since President Ma Ying-Jeou took office in 2008. This article intends to use Guzman's rational choice theory of international law to analyze Taiwan's motivation for signing ECFA under East Asian regionalism, and to speculate whether Taiwan will abide by the relevant ECFA regulations. Signing the ECFA with China is mainly to break through the predicament of Taiwan's isolation under East Asian regionalism. As the first step in cooperation with East Asia, ECFA has a significant impact on Taiwan's credibility in East Asia. Regardless of whether there is a chance to cooperate with other East Asian countries in the future, if Taiwan gets off ECFA's relevant regulations, it will cause damage to Taiwan's credibility and may even obliterate the possibility of future cooperation with East Asian countries. Therefore, from the perspective of rational choice, in order to maintain Taiwan's good reputation and look forward to more cooperation possibilities in the future, complying with the relevant ECFA regulations is an obligation that Taiwan must fulfil.

Keywords: International law, Rational choice, East Asian regionalism, ECFA

Foreword

On June 29, 2010, China and Taiwan signed the "Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement" (ECFA) in Chongqing; this agreement is an important milestone between the two sides of the strait, and since President Ma Ying-Jeou took office in 2008, The main result of improving the close cross-strait relations in the past. The agreement attracted the attention of many scholars in Taiwan and abroad; in particular, scholars from China and Taiwan invested much effort in research no matter whether the evaluation before signing the agreement or the review after signing the agreement. (Chu, 2010)

The motivation for Taiwan to sign the ECFA was mainly affected by the "ASEAN Plus Three" Free Trade Agreement, especially after the "ASEAN Plus China" was officially launched in January 2010. Taiwan, which relies heavily on China in trade, is bound to be the economy has been dramatically affected. Therefore, some scholars believe that the main reason for Taiwan's signing of the ECFA is to slow down the possible impact of the "ASEAN plus China" on Taiwan. (Zuo and Ye, 2011: 81-128) However, the motivations for Taiwan's signing of the ECFA is to get rid of the predicament of being isolated in the East Asian economic integration. This is

also the primary consideration for the Ma Ying-Jeou government. The most crucial factor for Taiwan to sign the ECFA is its desire to integrate into entire East Asia or name the "ASEAN Plus Three" and the China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJKFTA). It is also known as "Tripartite Cooperation" (The Trilateral Cooperation and the "Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation" are in full swing of discussions and cooperation today, which can break through the predicament of Taiwan's isolation in the process of East Asia integration. (Wu, 2005: 1-27)

Since President Ma Ying-Jeou took office in 2008, it has been an essential policy to improve the tight cross-strait relations and enable Taiwan to enter the international community. After Taiwan has ran more pragmatic and gentler foreign policies, namely "Flexible diplomacy" and "Diplomatic truce" policy, the ECFA emerged when cross-strait relations thawed out and revived, and there was substantial progress. (Wu, 2011: 53-59) After the signing of the ECFA, the studies on the legal positioning of the agreement, review procedures, and the relationship with Taiwan's status have emerged. The research on the relationship between Taiwan with China has mostly focused on the field of international relations. (Wu, 2007: 117-139) Therefore, this research aims to link the research in the field of international

relations and international law. Then, analyze the rational choice factors of Taiwan's signing of ECFA under the influence of East Asian regionalism; at the same time, explore how the substance of ECFA or political factors will affect cross-strait compliance with the agreement. (Huang, 2009: 169-192)

Rational Choice Theory in International Law

"Rational actor" is a widespread and long-standing assumption in the study of international relations. This assumption derives from the economics assumption that the actions of producers and consumers based on rational calculations. Therefore, according to economics, there are human beings with actionability can be regarded as actors, who will accumulate the most appropriate amount of information and input factors in the market under a set of stable preferences in order to maximize personal utility. In this regard, when explaining the reasons for international events, researchers usually presuppose the state as a rational actor. However, under the principle of pursuing the maximization of its interests, we believe that the diplomatic behavior of the country is the result of rational calculation.

The rational choice theory of international law tends to bring to perfection in Guzman's 2008 work. The

theory is close to the rule and does not emphasize the interpretation of the connotation of the law. Nevertheless, it discusses why the country abides by international law and the effectiveness of international law. The scholars of international law generally believe that international law can affect state behavior. However, they have not provided a good theory to explain how or when a state will abide by international law, or when international law is effectiveness. Social science scholars are mainly composed of political science scholars. It is skeptical about whether international law can influence state behavior, but it has not yet developed a comprehensive explanation of how international law is sufficient. (Abbot, 2004-2005) Guzman sorted out the views of scholars in the two fields of international law and social sciences. His views are between the above two. He mainly discusses the international legal system and believes that the rational choice is a theory that combines the views of scholars in the two fields.

According to the rational choice theory, the state is rational, self-interested, and able to define and pursue its interests. The rational model is a standard hypothesis between the views of many international law scholars and social science scholars. Although it is not perfect, it is widely regarded as useful and close to reality. At

the same time, the assumption that the state is a rational actor is not conducive to cooperation, because the country will only cooperate if the cooperation is beneficial to itself. In a self-interested international society, Guzman proposed that the game between countries can be divided into two situations: the simple form of cooperation and the prisoner's dilemma. The simple form of cooperation means that when there are common interests between countries, cooperation will be quite valuable and easy to achieve. Generally, when it is easy to reach cooperation, countries tend to cooperate in the form of memorandums, rather than formal treaties, because treaties usually cost more. However, if a formal treaty is necessary, in some cases, countries can use treaties to regulate future negotiation mode and reduce the cost of future negotiations. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement is a good example. However, when both parties do not understand the other's thoughts or information is asymmetry, both parties tend to choose not to cooperate, which is the best result, rather than to choose the best result of cooperation, which is consistent with the prisoner's dilemma in economics. In critical international issues, the US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is an example that can be used as proof.

Why countries abide by international law and the effectiveness of international

law is a mystery that international law scholars have been unable to understand, and it is also a complicated problem that social scientists cannot explain. The rational choice theory is an integral theory explaining why countries abide by international law and the effectiveness of international law. It can be regarded as a significant point to develop the theory of international law. After reviewing the rational choice argument in transformational economics, Guzman believes that in a self-interested international environment, the reason why countries comply with treaties is mainly affected by the three Rs compliance, that is reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation. Among the three Rs compliance, Guzman attaches the most importance to the impact of credibility on the country's compliance with international law. The following is a brief overview of the connotation of the three Rs compliance and then discusses the reputation.

1. Reputation: The credibility of a country is formed by its past behavior and is the criterion for other countries to judge the country's future behavior. The utility and characteristics of credibility in promoting compliance with treaties or international law are as follows:

- a. A country that abides by international law will gain an excellent international reputation and be considered a right partner; but a country that does not abide by international law will not only break the international reputation of the meeting, but also be viewed an untrustworthy partner, and it may even damage today's The promise that other countries hate it will make it harder to be accepted by other countries in the future.
 - b. The country has no particular preference for an excellent international reputation, just because maintaining international reputation may affect its benefits in the international community.
 - c. A good reputation can take the country to enter into cooperative arrangements, and it is less necessary to bargain with other countries on some issues.
 - d. Since international law is not mandatory, countries will rely on reputation as a criterion to encourage compliance with international law.
2. Reciprocity: The reciprocity or interaction between countries

makes each country afraid of the other party's possible actions when it violates international law. Therefore, it is a way to promote countries' compliance with international law. Its characteristics and functions are as follows:

- a. Eliminate the possibility of two or more parties violating treaties or international law in the future.
 - b. If the breached party does not tolerate the breach of the treaty and takes specific countermeasures against it, the breached will be deterred and will not dare to violate other international laws or treaties.
 - c. Due to the frequent exchanges between countries in the international society, the future benefits of one party are usually more generous than the benefits of a temporary violation of treaties or international law, so that countries tend to comply with international law.
3. Retaliation: A rational country will not take retaliatory actions against other countries because of resentment or anger. There must be other reasons. So, retaliatory actions can only occur when there is a benefit to the retaliatory country.

Consequently, the reasons for taking retaliatory actions and possible gains. The effect is as follows:

- a. The country will achieve the effect of retaliating against a country, letting other countries know that the country will not tolerate violations of international law or treaties, and then comply with international law or treaties with that country.
- b. Through retaliatory actions, the retaliated country deeply understands the consequences of violating the treaty or international law, so that it no longer breaches the contract and returns to the formal system.

Whether a country abides by international law and treaties is affected by the interaction of the above three compliances, of which mutuality is an essential principle for countries to abide by norms in international multilateral cooperation. However, when encountering public finances or collective decisions or actions, they will encounter difficulties. At this time, it must be supplemented through retaliation or using other countries' emphasis on international reputation to achieve their goals. As a result, it can be seen that the three are complementary to

each other when explaining why countries abide by international law or international treaties. (Guzman, 2008)

The importance of Reputation: The countries must comply with international law

The reputation model is quite similar to the model developed by Mercer in 1996. The reputation model is quite similar to the model developed by Mercer in 1996. The situational attributes mentioned by Mercer are consistent with Guzman's non-reputational payoffs, and the dispositional attributes are consistent with reputational payoffs. Mercer believes that reputation or non-reputational payoff will affect a country's decision to comply with international law, the act of deciding to comply in a specific situation can provide information on how the country will act in other situations in the future. Therefore, based on the above view, Guzman believes that reputation will change; whether an individual behavior of the country affects the related reputation is mainly judged from the following three factors. First, the country is facing non-reputational payoffs; second, the reputation of the country in action; third, the importance of obligations to other countries. These three factors can also help explain why the decision to

violate or comply or produce different reputation results in different situations.

In the practice of international law, it is easier to judge whether a state's behavior has caused a change in reputation by considering both reputation and non-reputational payoffs. If the country only judges whether it is illegal or complying with non-reputational payoffs, the overall reputation will not increase or decrease; if it is weighed with existing reputation, non-reputational payoffs tendencies and decision-making, the following situations may occur. First, when a country initially has a good reputation, but its non-reputational payoffs tend to violate international law. Finally, the country decides to abide by international law, the benefit is the continued trust of other countries, and then the reputation is strengthened rather than increased. Conversely, if a country decides to violate the law, other countries will have lower expectations of that country. Secondly, if a country does not abide by the precedent of international law and is notorious in the practice of international law if it decides to abide by the international law, it will make other countries amend their expectations of that country. However, if it still decides to violate the law, the views and credibility of other countries will not change. Because of this, we can find that when the non-reputational payoffs are illegal, and the

state decides to comply, the overall reputation will increase, and vice versa. (Armstrong, 2007)

Some scholars believe that different treaties and agreements will, indeed result in different types of reputation. The reputation of a country is not determined solely based on maintaining the country. Observing countries also have influence. The reputation of a country can be roughly divided into the following two types.

1. Once we recognize that countries may have a different reputation if reputation across the negotiating field affects each other, it is evident that reputation is affected by other aspects. For example, the reputation of the country will be affected by the incumbent regime. For example, the Democratic Party's entry into the White House may reduce the reputation of the United States in following the free trade agreement. Because the Democratic Party relies on labor for political support, the commitment to the free trade agreement seems to be recent. The signed Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Area (DR-CAFTA) may be questioned. What can be determined from the above examples is that the new regime may be able to take the role of a successor to obtain the benefits of complying with its promises. The effect of reputation can also be produced in this way.

2. The behavior patterns of the state towards allies and enemies or competitors will not be the same. A rational state will take "different objects" into consideration when interacting with other countries. For example, if the United States and Canada agreement, the United States will gain benefits based on Canada's affirmation of its reputation and trust; while interacting with Iranian countries, the United States can almost certainly have a smaller positive reputation.

In the previous paragraph, the source of the discussion of reputation, the changing factors of national reputation and the distinction of reputation have been briefly introduced. However, in Guzman's rational choice theory of international law, why state behavior is affected by reputation is also one of the focuses of his discussion. First of all, in Guzman's 2008 thesis, countries usually decide whether to comply with international law based on their reputation and future rewards; because the country knows that the effect of compliance is gradual and can strategically operate its reputation over time. Secondly, the country's willingness to rebuild its reputation or maintain a good reputation comes from cost calculations, and different national conditions consider different factors. Take North Korea, Libya, and South Africa as examples. North Korea does not care about the views of other

countries, Libya's subsequent compromise, and South Africa's ethnic purification policy. We are cautious about situations such as violations of the law. We can find that the country does not necessarily pursue reputation reconstruction, and may temporarily sacrifice reputation for short-term benefits because the reputation costs of violations are relatively low or the benefits are relatively high.

Furthermore, the more stable countries have a more established reputation; any single act performed or violated will have less impact on this type of country, because other countries have strong preconceived ideas. For example, Gorbachev improves the reputation of the Soviet Union. Finally, political scientists will use the signaling theory to model the cost of states showing their reputation. Kydd pointed out that if country A wants to increase its cooperative relationship with country B, but country B does not believe in country A, country A must make a higher cost signal to show country B that it is a reliable partner. The signal must be cheap enough for the sender to afford, and expensive enough for the receiving target to update its impression of the sender's reliability.

In the discussion of the rational choice school of international law, Guzman proposed that the Three Rs principle is an essential factor that affects the country's decision to comply with international law.

In the Three Rs principle, Guzman believes that reputation is the most critical factor affecting a country's compliance with international law; in the context of information asymmetry among countries in the world, individual countries' compliance with international law in the past, as well as their relationship. The relationship between these countries will affect whether each country will abide by the treaty after signing a treaty with other countries. Therefore, from Guzman's point of view, the consideration of reputation includes two aspects; one is the country's perception of other countries' reputation and the consideration of its costs and benefits; the other is the relationship between states and the influences of state's compliance with treaties. (Slaughter, 2000)

The implication and benefits of ECFA

ECFA is an architectural agreement signed between China and Taiwan in Chongqing on June 29, 2010. From the perspective of WTO regulations, ECFA is a "transitional agreement" of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The purpose is to determine an absolute consensus of the contracting states and to enable the two parties to start negotiations and establish a negotiation mechanism within a predictable period. Moreover, the framework agreement, which is more flexible in terms of negotiation topics and timing, can reduce

the time pressure to build domestic consensus, and is more suitable for Taiwan, where domestic politics is currently divided (Lin, 2009). As far as the content of ECFA is concerned, according to Tong Zhenyuan (2011), ECFA is divided into five chapters, 16 articles and five annexes. The contents include tax reduction and exemption of goods, the opening of the service industry market, promotion and protection of investment by both parties, and economic and industrial development: cooperation and other fields.

The reason for Taiwan to signing the ECFA is, for Taiwan, facing the intense pressure of East Asian regional integration, so it has multiple benefits for Taiwan (Zhang, 2011: 118-123). First of all, the signing of ECFA allows Taiwan to cope with the deadlock in WTO negotiations. At the beginning of Taiwan's accession to the WTO, it hoped to obtain a fair field of competition, and it could also increase exports through the WTO's market opening. (Zhu and Tan, 2005: 1-40) However, at the WTO roundtables in Uruguay and Doha, member countries did not reach a consensus. Furthermore, negotiations have been delayed. In the absence of apparent progress in the WTO negotiations, the signing of the ECFA can slightly alleviate the considerable pressure caused by Taiwan's failure in WTO negotiations and the integration of East Asia. Second, ECFA

can prevent Taiwan from being marginalized in the integration of East Asia. Because of Taiwan's unique political status, China claims that Taiwan is part of its territory. China uses its influence on neighboring economic powers to prevent them from signing free-trade agreements (FTAs) with Taiwan. (Xu and Chen, 2011)

After signing the ECFA with China, the Taiwanese government believes the ECFA will help create 260,000 jobs and boost economic growth by as much as 1.7%. The cross-strait relations have finally improved, and other countries in the world may consider signing an FTA with Taiwan, which will help Taiwan expand its international economic and trade space. Finally, Taiwan will have the opportunity to expand its product to China's domestic market. (Wu, 2012: 143-181) In recent years, China is a rising economy, and its consumption power in the domestic market is widely attracted. Through ECFA, the Taiwanese can strengthen cross-strait industrial cooperation, technical exchanges and strategic alliances. On the one hand, it can strengthen the protection of Taiwanese companies in the Chinese market, and on the other hand, it can also expand the domestic market in China. (Wu and Zeng, 2005: 57-91)

Analysis of regulations and ECFA from the perspective of the Rational of Choice Theory

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, from a political or economic perspective, Taiwan's signing of the ECFA seems to have fully considered the maximization of benefits and Taiwan's unique political status. Taiwan will abide by the relevant regulations in the ECFA or not. It is impossible to observe Taiwan's behavior with certainty. However, the rational choice theory in international law can still be used to match the current international situation and Taiwan's performance in facing the international environment to analyze and speculate.

In the discussion of the rational choice theory of international law, Guzman proposed that the Three Rs principle is an essential factor that affects the country's decision to comply with international law. In the Three Rs principle, Guzman believes that reputation is the most critical factor affecting a country's compliance with international law; in the context of information asymmetry among countries in the world, individual countries' compliance with international law in the past, as well as their relationship. The relationship between these countries will affect whether each country will abide by the treaty after signing a treaty with other countries. Therefore, from Guzman's point, the

consideration of reputation includes two aspects; one is the country's perception of the reputation of other countries and the consideration of its costs and benefits, namely the so-called credit and non-credit compensation, and the other is the state. The impact of inter-state relations on whether the two countries abide by the treaty.

Taiwan's rational choice for signing the ECFA also includes consideration of the above factors. First, it is the part of Taiwan's perception of China's reputation; due to the complicated political factors in the past between the two sides of the strait and Taiwan's special status, the content of cross-strait cooperation in the economic field is limited. In particular, because Taiwan is affected by the rotation of political parties and the election cycle, its cross-strait policies are not as consistent as China's. Therefore, in terms of the cooperation agreement signed between the two sides, it may be more likely that Taiwan will not comply with the agreement. In the areas where two sides previously cooperated, the areas of cooperation between the two sides are mostly limited to terms related to the people on both sides of the strait, such as the connection of people, and there is no economic or political cooperation agreement. In this regard, Taiwan's perception of China's reputation should theoretically be inclined to believe

that China will not break the contract, but the extent of its compliance is different. Guzman also put forward the view that countries will have different credibility. The current situations in Taiwan, because of the KMT and the DPP have different views on China, if the KMT is in power, its confidence in China's compliance with the ECFA will be higher; Complying with relevant ECFA regulations will result in less confidence.

Secondly, the rational choice factor for Taiwan's signing of ECFA, of course, also has its non-reputation payoffs. In Guzman's discussion, he mentioned that national security considerations are most likely to prompt the country to not comply with the agreement. National security is, of course, the most crucial consideration for Taiwan; since 1949, China has always been a significant threat to Taiwan's national security, and the two sides have had many sporadic skirmishes. In order to resist the threat from China, the Taiwanese authorities' maintenance of national defense strength as an essential policy of Taiwan. Furthermore, the purchase of US arms has never stopped; even in Ma Ying-Jeou administration, he decided to have a good relationship with China. Ma still emphasized it many times in public about the importance of national defense to facing China's threats .

Moreover, Taiwan's security has always been the primary consideration of Taiwan's leaders. Under the above preconditions, we can speculate that if China poses a threat to Taiwan's security, it will most likely allow Taiwan to choose not to comply with the agreement; however, in the current international situation, both China and Taiwan need a stable environment. With economic development, the possibility of conflict between the two parties is not high, and the possibility of Taiwan choosing not to comply with the agreement is not high.

Finally, Guzman believes that the state-to-state relationship also affects whether the state abides by the treaty or agreement. Looking at the situation on both sides of the strait, the complicated political relationship between the two sides in the past and the worst relationship with China in the later period of President Lee Teng-hui and President Chen Shui-bian will affect the trust of both sides in each other. Although the relationship between China and Taiwan is not an absolute ally or enemy relationship, because of the gap in cross-strait policies between the KMT and the DPP, the two parties have entirely different attitudes towards China. China's attitude towards the two parties has also changed accordingly. From the experience of the past decades, the mutual trust between the two parties was more vital during the Kuomintang administration, and the

relationship between the two parties tended to be friends. While when the DPP was in power because the DPP was ideologically more radical, They have frequently angered China, causing bad relations and lack of trust between the two sides. However, after the 2012 presidential election in Taiwan, most people think that the DPP has deeply realized the importance of cross-strait policies. Therefore, we can expect that no matter which party is in power in the future, there should be no too much policy towards China. With drastic changes, the trust relationship between the two sides of the strait should be gradually consolidated.

Based on the above factors, it clear that in cross-strait cooperation, Taiwan is affected by domestic political factors and is more likely to not abide by the treaty. Moreover, the financial turmoil in European and American and the rising economies in Southeast Asian countries and China have become substantial investment and cooperation targets for countries to overcome economic depression. Taiwan, which was affected by the economic depression, faced the stagnant economic growth and increased unemployment but was isolated in the integration of the East Asian region, and it was unable to pin its hopes for economic recovery on economic cooperation with East Asian countries. Therefore, given the intense pressure of East Asian regional

integration, the expectation of economic recovery and Taiwan's unique political status, the signing of ECFA with China has become a necessary export for Taiwan to break through its difficulties. Also, there is pessimistic sound about Taiwan can sign an FTA with other East Asian countries or not, Taiwan always struggling to survive in the cracks. The only way is to choose to comply with the ECFA signed with China; if Taiwan complies with the provisions of the ECFA may create a good reputation for compliance with the agreement for Taiwan. In the future, it may also sign FTAs with other East Asian countries. Furthermore, if Taiwan decides not to comply with the ECFA because of party rotation or other trivial matters, it will undermine Taiwan's reputation in East Asia. In the future, China will not need to block it, and no country will be willing to sign an FTA with Taiwan. (Zheng, 2010: 46-56)

Conclusion

ECFA is an important milestone between the Taiwan authority and the Chinese government. It is also the most critical achievement in improving the close cross-strait relations since President Ma Ying-Jeou took office in 2008. Most scholars believe that the main factor for Taiwan to sign ECFA is to get rid of the predicament of being isolated in the East Asian economic integration. It is also the

primary consideration of the Ma Ying-Jeou presidency. In East Asia, China and Japan are both important trading partners of Taiwan, and the ASEAN countries are also important targets for Taiwan's current and future investments. Therefore, being excluded from the integration of the East Asian region will not only make Taiwan suffer from the effects of trade creation and trade diversion when trading with essential trading partners but also make Taiwan in the entire region unable to compete with South Korea. The competition of significant economic and trade competition countries is a lose-lose result for Taiwan.

In the era of globalization, all countries share weal and woe, and no country can stay out of it. Therefore, when faced with the integration of East Asia, it is impossible for Taiwan to cope with ever-changing changes or to integrate itself from the outside world. However, it seems that it is not a feasible solution if it is placed on WTO multilateral negotiations. Since the Uruguay Round, negotiations under the WTO structure have been delayed in real progress. Therefore, it is not feasible to expect WTO negotiations to bring solutions to Taiwan's current difficulties. Therefore, signing FTAs with other countries is currently Taiwan's only option. Whichever party is in power, in the face of global challenges and crises, countries in Southeast Asia have become new

investment targets and markets. The new emerging countries in East Asia have become important global investment targets and the main breakthrough point for getting rid of economic recession. It is bound to break through the predicament of being isolated in the integration of East Asia. Because of Taiwan's unique political status, most countries often use cross-strait relations or China's views as the standard when cooperating with Taiwan; if China disagrees or may endanger cross-strait relations, other countries will not consider cooperating with Taiwan. Therefore, signing the ECFA with China has become the only feasible plan for Taiwan.

After signing the ECFA with China, whether Taiwan will abide by the agreement with China is an essential point of discussion in this article. In the international environment where the global economic depression must rely on the economic strength of the emerging East Asian countries, Taiwan must carry out economic cooperation with East Asian countries. Signing the ECFA with China is Taiwan's first step. Even though many scholars are pessimistic about whether Taiwan can sign FTAs with other East Asian countries after the ECFA, Taiwan, which is struggling to survive in the cracks, can only choose to comply with the ECFA signed with China. ECFA is the first step for Taiwan's authority to enter other

economic cooperation with other countries. ECFA has a decisive impact on Taiwan's reputation in East Asia; if Taiwan complies with the provisions of ECFA, it may create a good reputation for compliance with the agreement for Taiwan, and it may also cooperate with other East Asian countries in the future.

Furthermore, if Taiwan decides not to comply with the ECFA because of party rotation or other trivial matters, it will undermine Taiwan's reputation in East Asia. In the future, China will not need to block Taiwan from international cooperation, and no country will be willing to sign an FTA with Taiwan. It can be seen that if Taiwan does not abide by the relevant ECFA regulations, it will damage Taiwan's reputation in East Asia. The damage caused is not only China's distrust of Taiwan and the destruction of cooperation but also the distrust of Taiwan in the entire East Asia region and the obliteration of the future.

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