

## **The Implementation of France's National Security Policy: Reinforcing French National Security to Respond ISIS Threats in 2014-2016**

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### **Abstrak**

*Serangkaian serangan teror yang terjadi di Prancis sejak deklarasi kekhalifahan ISIS pada tahun 2014 telah membuktikan bahwa ruang lingkup operasi ISIS tidak lagi terbatas pada wilayah mereka, melainkan telah menyebar ke seluruh dunia. Oleh karena itu, dengan dasar rencana Vigipirate, Prancis telah berusaha untuk memaksimalkan upaya mereka dalam menanggapi serangan, mulai dari persatuan nasional dalam menghadapi masalah terorisme, intervensi langsung terhadap pangkalan utama ISIS, operasi di dalam negeri, dan bahkan memproklamkan keadaan darurat negara. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif, tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis implementasi kebijakan keamanan nasional Prancis dalam menanggapi ancaman tersebut. Meskipun serangan teror masih terjadi hingga saat ini, tetapi analisis fokus kepatuhan ini hanya terbatas pada masa pemerintahan Presiden Francois Hollande dari tahun 2014 - 2016. Dalam temuan tersebut, penulis menyimpulkan bahwa selama pemerintahan Presiden Francois Hollande, upaya sekuritisasi Prancis tidak menjadi penghalang bagi militan ISIS dalam meluncurkan aksi mereka di tanah Prancis.*

**Kata Kunci:** *Terorisme, ISIS, Prancis, Propaganda dan Rekrutmen, Sekuritisasi, Vigipirate, Keadaan Darurat Negara*

### **Abstract**

The series of terror attacks that occurred in France since the declaration of ISIS caliphate in 2014 has proven that the scope of ISIS operations is no longer limited to their territorial, instead has spread throughout the world. Therefore, with the foundation of Vigipirate plan, France has tried to maximize their efforts in responding the attacks, starting from national unity in the face of terrorism issue, direct intervention towards ISIS main base, operation within the country, and even proclaiming a state of emergency. By using qualitative method, this writing aims to analyse the implementation of France's national security policy in responding the threats. Although terror attacks still occurred to date, but this analysis of compliance focus is limited to only during President Francois Hollande administration from 2014 - 2016. In the finding, the author concludes that during President Francois Hollande administration, the France's securitization efforts did not become a barrier for ISIS militants in launching their actions in France.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, ISIS, France, Propaganda and Recruitment, Securitization, Vigilance, State of Emergency

## 1. Introduction

In today's society, terrorism is considered as a real threat which can worsen international security and peace (Värk, 2011, p. 74). The terrorists are non-state actors in International Relations. The rapid growth of globalization in line with the technological advancement can facilitate the mobility movements of terrorists and other group related in carrying out their propaganda actions in order to gain a new supporters and followers, as well as moral and financial funding for their activities in the long-term period.

The September 11 tragedy reminds us that as an international community, we are required to increase our awareness in the issue of terrorism which has been quite rampant now. Terrorism is a global threat that needs to be observed and addressed by each state appropriately, especially since June 29, 2014, when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a radical Islamic organization caught the spotlight due to their successful achievement in forming the so-called Caliphate (a government that unites all Muslims in the world) (Barret, 2014). The November 13, 2015 (11/13) tragedy was a series of successive attacks which was operated for the first time by the international terrorist group pro-ISIS in France (Callimachi, 2015). By doing this, ISIS has clearly expanded its operations outside of their main base in the Middle East.

The 11/13 tragedy was speculated to be a part of the resistance of ISIS towards the orientation of the Western Culture in freedom and democracy; however, this reason may not be appropriate since France is not the only state is Western Culture oriented (Muro, 2015). Another assumption is that the policies made during President Francois Hollande administration in the Middle East region specifically after France military intervention in Mali 2013, along with Hollande scathing critics towards Bashar Al-Asaad in Syria and their military intervention in Syrian civil war during 2014, have brought such negative impact towards their own state. Those assumptions above are said to be the main reasons why France is in the top list targets of ISIS.

For France, prioritizing this issue to ensure national security and standing out as a role player in the international community is the greatest challenge in the mid of the terrorist phenomenon. As a response to the frequent terror attacks in France, high vigilance has been generated in the governance to respond to the issue quickly and effectively.

France has experienced numerous terror attacks since 2015, namely Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 with 17 deaths, 11/13 tragedy with 130 deaths, Nice Vehicle tragedy in 2016 with 87 deaths and many more (CNN Library, 2017; CNN Library, 2018; Fischer & Sofia, 2016). Therefore, France has made the issue

of terrorism as one of the main threats that they are facing today which needs a rapid response. In the extensive discussion about terror incidents in France, the main challenge faced by the government of France is maintaining its national security. Hence, this article aims to explain the implementation of France's national security policy in responding to ISIS threats.

### 1.1. Terrorism as an Existential Threat for France

Hollande has once stated the existence of terrorism in France is an existential threat (Lister, 2016). The supporting evidence of the existing and potential ISIS threat includes radicalization in prison, foreign fighters and lone actors. Frequent terror attacks that have occurred in France since 2015 has motivated Hollande to call for the statement of 'the war on terror' right after the 11/13 tragedy and made terrorism as a major threat to France's national security (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 2015).

The problem of terrorism, especially the threat from ISIS that is faced by France has been accepted by the French society. Referring to the survey conducted by ViaVoice, the French population is still affected by the attacks. It is found that one from two French still think about the attacks at least once a week. When they think about it, approximately 56% feel anger, 48% feel sad, 24% feel hatred and 22% feel fear (Biseau, 2016). From this percentage, we can see that the society is still traumatized by the attacks. The attacks have also changed their mindset, making them live with fear of potential attacks. Around 79% of the people believe that there will always be a risk of attack while the remaining 16% believe in the opposite (Biseau, 2016).

The frequent terror attacks taking place in in France shows how ISIS has succeeded in almost each campaign and that they have done both recruiting new members or calling for lone-actors to launch their actions. Therefore, the occurrence of a series of attacks in France since 2015 has made not only Hollande as a President of France feel the pressure against the threat, but has also made the French citizens' live in fear of another attack in the future. Consequently, the people have begun to question the ability of Hollande to deal with the issue and minimize the risk during his administration.

### 1.2. The Problem of France's Foreign Fighters and Their Short Journey to France

The problem of foreign fighters is seen as a threat due to the two factors, such as the battlefield experience and their network of contacts which increase their ability to carry out attacks. They are generally assumed to be motivated and many of them are considered insensitive to violence and brainwashed by the organization they follow (Reed and Pohl, 2017). This problem is further aggravated due to hundreds of children from France who, having been brought into conflict zones by their parents and born there, also make up a portion of foreign fighters returning

to France. According to the French government archives in 2017, more than half of the children there were under the age of 5 (Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, 2018). It can be seen that there are various profiles that have contributed to the conflict zone in Syria starting from the very high number of women and children who joined, various levels of radicalization and the continuing attraction of ISIS ideology that is easy to access through the internet. Moreover, the European Union (EU) has categorized the number of Foreign Fighters in Europe and France, as shown in the figure below:




Figure 1. Foreign Fighters in France (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2018)

The figure above shows that there is a variation between the rate of return of foreign fighters in some of EU member states and that France has contributed a high number for this polemic. France has also received a relatively lower rate of returnees.

The 11/13 tragedy was conducted by at least eight perpetrators who were all foreign fighters returning from Syria, including attackers and facilitators (Brisard, 2015). In addition to group leaders, those who carried out the attack were French citizens. Some are based in the Molenbeek area in Brussels, Belgium. The leader of the group is the well-known Belgian foreign fighter named Abdelhamid Abaaoud. He and his childhood friend, the French foreign fighter named Salah Abdeslam, are believed to have planned, prepared and coordinated the attack. The two men were sentenced in February 2011 for their joint involvement in the

crime in Belgium (Brisard, 2015). Furthermore, most of the attackers had returned to Europe in August 2015 precisely three months before the attack was launched, and at least two of them entered Europe in October through the flow of refugees from the Greek island of Leros. Once in Europe, at least one of them, Salah Abdeslam, travelled back and forth from Brussels to Paris in September and October (Callimachi, Bennhold, & Forurquet, 2015).

From the 11/13 tragedy we can see that the movement of ISIS in France was well-organized as ISIS gained an easy way to reach Europe and France in particular to launch the attack. Besides, the effectiveness of Schengen agreement also allows free movement in Europe in order for the perpetrator to reach Europe and conduct the attacks as the case from Abaaoud.

### 1.3. ISIS Propaganda and Recruitment in France

The propaganda of ISIS as well as their recruitment network through social media, are well-managed by delivering to the main target audience which is young people. Through their messages, ISIS offers those who are unemployed, alienated and are confused by their religion and invite them to live under the Caliphate and fight against the enemies of ISIS.

In Paris, there is a suburb area that is a fertile ground for recruiting members of radical groups from France and known as *banlieues*, which connotes slums and low-income housing projects that are home to immigrants and descendants of immigrants (Boag, 2015). In the *banlieues*, there are *cités*, a mass settlement that was established in the post-war era which was intended to be a settlement of workers but has transformed into a poor and isolated area with social problems among the society in it (Misra, 2017). *The area has been suspected as a fertile field of jihadists:*

*"Even though they are still in the Paris region, however, many people refer to them by the term 'the other Paris' (Infoaut, 2015).*

The feeling of isolation from the whole of French society is common among French society towards immigrant descent, especially if they are Muslims. Unfortunately, those Muslims often live poorly with a high rate of unemployment. The poverty and unemployment problems that they experience come from people discrimination when those Muslims (immigrant descent) are looking for jobs.

A short story about *banlieues* can be used for the discussion considering ISIS uses the people who live there especially young people with social problems and are very vulnerable to radicalization. By disseminating ISIS's radical ideology and disseminating "jihad" propaganda and all the benefits by joining ISIS and live under the ISIS Caliphate, ISIS has succeeded in making the area a fertile ground where ISIS militants are recruited from France.

## **2. Discussion: The Implementation of France's National Security Policy to Respond to ISIS Threats in 2014 – 2016 Period**

The year of 2015 becomes a historical year for France when France under Hollande administration was tested with a series of acts of terror which was almost all ISIS affiliated in term of supporters, followers or sympathizers (Lister *et. al.*, 2018). After a massive attack affiliated with one of Radical Islamic Organization called Al Qaeda that took place in France in January 2015 (known as the Charlie Hebdo attack), November 2015 becomes an important date in France's history because of severe terror attacks that have killed at least 130 people and more than 400 people were injured from the attacks (Sahill, 2017; QuinnWilliams, 2016). The frequent terror attacks in France remind that the presence and threats from ISIS does not recognize territorial boundaries, time and even human principles. This also shows where ISIS has targeted victims without aware the age, gender, and background limits.

### **2.1. Vigipirate Plan as a French National Plan for Protection Against the Terrorist Threat**

France has an official document containing their plan in preparing France facing the such threats in which the focus of the implementation will be in the national level (Office of Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, 2016). Building on that, one of the first lines of threat identified in the French national security strategy (in their White Paper since 2008 which was later discussed in the 2013 White Paper) is the increasing threat of terrorism regardless of whether it is applied at the national level, citizens and French interests in abroad, or in the scope of cyberspace (Office of Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, 2016). Therefore, the Vigipirate plan is its national planning document in preparing France for this situation.

The plan was first made in 1978 during the administration of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to prevent threats and respond to terrorist acts (Lee, 2017). Moreover, starting in 2003 France has created the Vigipirate plan based on the system classified four levels of threats by using four colors representing each situation. These levels call for special security measures such as increasing patrol between the police and the military in vulnerable and strategic places. Since the Vigipirate plan was formed, the year of 1991, when the Gulf War broke out, became the first year of France implementing the plan, continued with the terror attack in Paris in 1995 (Estellec, 2016; Dejevsky, 1995).

Building on that, in 2014, the leveling in each of the threats became obsolete due to France being constantly on alert since the attack on London in 2005 and is regularly strengthened with red levels during the holiday season (Block, 2005). The scarlet level as the highest level in the Vigipirate plan was activated only once after an attack carried out by Mohammed Merah in Toulouse in 2012 or known as Toulouse and Montauban shootings (Grant, 2012). Therefore, in February 2014,

France updated their Vigipirate plan into two levels of threats: “vigilance” and “attack alert” (*Vigilance and Alerte Attentat*) up until November 2016.

However, the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks and legislative provisions adopted in 2016 led to a revision of the Vigipirate plan to adapt it to very high threats (France Government, 2018). Therefore, since the severe attacks in 2015, starting from December 2016 France has re-upgraded their Vigipirate plan and come up into three levels in defining the crises situation and has not changed until now. The new version of the Vigipirate plan is based on three pillars, namely: level of alertness, increased level of security - the risk of attack and the level of emergency attacks. In short, below is the figure of the timeline of the changes on the Vigipirate Plan:




Figure 2. Timeline of the Changes of Vigipirate Plan in France

### 2.1.1. Declaring the State of Emergency

*"State of emergency is the reactivity, efficiency within the framework of our legal rules. This is not a neglect of the rule of law. All actions implemented will continue to be closely monitored by you and the administrative justice system".*

*-Manuel Valls in National Assembly, July 19, 2016*

The state of emergency is a statement from the government that can change government functions, warn citizens to change activities, or order state agencies to use emergency response plans in order to counteract further attacks (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005). This alarm condition was formed for the first time in France back in 1955 in an effort to deal with events

relating to the Algerian war where France felt their country was threatened by the war (Zaretsky, 2016). Thus, the state of emergency conditions authorize the government, especially the security authorities, in tightening certain areas in an effort to counteract the possibility of terror attacks.

Since the frequent terror attacks in France in 2015, Hollande began to declare the state of emergency status for France which means that the government can carry out all efforts stated at the 'attack emergency' level considering the state of emergency is the highest alarm of the Vigipirate plan (France24, 2015). Hollande announced that France was in an emergency situation as he stated in his speech on January 9, 2015, after the Charlie Hebdo attack (Embassy of France in Washington, D.C., 2015). In that case, the government promised to protect French people in all public places as much as possible and appealed to the community to remain vigilant and be able to work together with security personnel in carrying out their duties to arrest terrorists. After the November 2015 Paris attacks, four phases or four times of the extension on declaring the state of emergency was made, namely:

- The first phase of state of emergency declaration post 11/13 tragedy in 2015 and the first extension (November 13, 2015 - February 2016);
- The second phase of the extension (February - May 26, 2016);
- The third phase of the extension (May - July 26, 2016) with the consideration to protect Euro 2016 and Tour de France event;
- The fourth phase of the extension post-Nice Vehicle attack (July 2016 - January 2017).

#### 2.1.2. The Foundation of Measures under the Declaration of State of Emergency

Whenever the state of emergency is declared, there are some measures that need to be taken according to the French law which is the foundation of every activity, namely:

- Article 6 of the Law of 20 November 2015 regarding house arrest;
- Article 11 of the Law of 20 November 2015 regarding searches and confiscations of computer files;
- Article 8 of the Law of 20 November 2015 regarding public demonstrations banning;
- Article 6-1 of the Law of 20 November 2015 regarding the dissolution of associations and assemblies (International Federation for Human Rights, 2016).



During its declaration, there are some cases which make the laws on the State of Emergency bring cons among society, for instance the example below from the case of Amnesty International:

*"The search was very violent, for us, it was a desecration, it hurt our feelings and it scared us [...] The head of the mosque was also put in pre-charge detention afterward...but no charges were pressed against any of us, there were no concrete elements. That's the worst... If there were serious suspicions, they would have launched an investigation.... but at the moment it's like we're being punished for nothing"* (International Federation for Human Rights, 2016).

Another case from the collective report conducted by the International Organization for Human Rights, they found among the witnesses from the authorities' action towards them such as:

*"They came in and put a gun to my head...the search was carried out by the armed, hooded, policeman. We opened the door; they put my 13-years old son outside. They put me to one side and searched for me. I was treated as though I was nothing"* (International Federation for Human Rights, 2016).

By some cases, it is noted that during the State of Emergency declaration, some cons related to this action have been found. One of French 24-hour news channels, BFMTV has conducted a survey regarding the effectiveness of this action during the first extension of the state of emergency where only 60% of the French people believe that an emergency state is effective, but 74% of the respondents believe the extension is "justified". In addition, 6 out of 10 French people say they do not trust the President of the Republic to lead a war against terrorist threats (Chevalier, 2016).

## 2.2. Reinforcing New Law for France

Six laws have been formed as guidance for French policy in combating terrorism since 2012 and especially post-terror attacks in 2015. The six laws consist of two anti-terrorism laws (December 21, 2012, and November 13, 2014); one law regulates military program (December 18, 2013); two laws focusing on intelligence techniques (July 24 and November 30, 2015); and one law on organized crime that covers terrorism and their financing (Spring 2016) (Chevalier, 2016).

## 2.3. Strengthening their Border Control

Not only France needs to protect their internal security France also needs to consider their border control since it becomes the gateway for the perpetrator in reaching France. In this context, efforts to close the border cannot be fully realized considering many routes in France come from neighboring countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Spain (Noack, 2015). This

makes the success of border control efforts dependent not only on France itself but also on border cooperation with their neighboring countries. Moreover, France and Belgium pledged in February 2016 to strengthen cooperation between them in combating Islamic terrorism and called for the European Security Pact where the main focus was on improving information, intelligence and prevention systems, which not only apply to the two countries but towards Europe as a whole (Maurice, 2016).

In addition, Germany, Spain and Italy announced in July 2016 that they will improve border control at the airport and crossing roads as well as railways to France after the tragedy of Nice Attacks 2016. The announcement came after Italy, Spain, Germany, Britain and Belgium, all of whom were neighbors of France, held separate meetings to review their own security after the attack in the city of Nice (Daily Sabah, 2016).

#### 2.4. Increasing the French National Budget in Counter-Terrorism

Starting in 2014, France increased its budget allocation in an effort to fight terrorism. Before the Charlie Hebdo attacks, France allocated € 1.2 billion annually which focused on counter-terrorism efforts. However, after the attack, French Prime Minister announced an additional investment over € 735 million for a three-year period starting from 2015 (€ 245 million each year). From the total amount, € 310 million is allocated for the employment of an additional 2680 agents and € 425 million to improve the equipment (Bianchi, 2015). Therefore, the total budget allocation for each year became € 1.45 billion. This figure is beyond the calculation after the 2015 November Paris attacks tragedy in which Hollande called for an additional budget focusing on creating 8,500 posts to increase the number of state agents involved in the war on terrorism which is estimated around € 980 million for three years (approximately € 320 million for each year). Therefore, France has spent around € 1.77 billion for counter-terrorism since 2015.

According to the data above, the numbers mentioned earlier are not included in the costs of any external operations that France has carried out in combating global terrorism. Approximately € 100 million is allocated for French military operations in Central Africa, while € 650 million is allocated for military operations in Mali (Besson, 2015).

#### 2.5. Opération Sentinelle as France's Internal Operation in Fighting Terrorism

Opération Sentinelle is part of French military operations at the national level by deploying 10,000 troops and more than 4.5 thousand police stationed in several places in France to protect areas that are prone to terror threats (Europe1, 2015). The operation began to be conducted post-Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015 and was further strengthened post-November Paris attacks in 2015. The operation is part of the French policy under the state of emergency status which is also in line with

the status of French Vigipirate at its highest level. Opération Sentinelle is the first large-scale military operation in France (McGuinness, 2017).

Moreover, post-Charlie Hebdo attacks tragedy in 2015, France deployed 800 soldiers on the road along the city of Paris on the eve of the attacks. However, three days after the attacks, the French Ministry of Defense launched a military operation called Opération Sentinelle where they added 10,000 troops to the streets where 6,000 were placed specifically in the Paris region and the rest were deployed in French territory (Maillet-Contoz, 2018). Places that were made as security guard posts were schools, places of worship, entertainment venues and government buildings (Anderson, 2015).

Post-11/13 tragedy, France increased its internal security by deploying police forces to patrol and conducting searches for terrorist tracks. In this case, the French police have managed to search at least 2,000 homes, detain 212 people for questioning and then 250 people have undergone judicial procedures and placed 312 people under house arrest since the Paris Attacks incident until November 29, 2015 (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2015).

In the French Senate report wherein the report described the total costs incurred for operations against terrorism as follows:

<b>Year</b>	<b>Total Amount</b>
2012	€ 9.1 million
2013	€ 7.8 million
2014	€ 11.5 million
2015	€ 176.1 million
2016	€ 181.8 million

Table 2. Total Amount for France’s Opération Sentinelle

## **2.6. Improvement of the Detection of Radicalization Activities**

### *2.6.1. Focusing on those who have been radicalized*

In this term, the government focused to counter the process of radicalization in prison by employing additional Ulama (60 or 30% more) and providing the time for prisoners for daily prayers and consuming halal food to avoid the phenomenon of marginalization of Muslim prisoners (Gouvernement.fr , 2015). Beside that, they also conducted the separation of jihadi prisoners from other prisoners to avoid the spread of the ideology of extremism and the recruitment activity (Henley, 2016). In this case, France provides five special environments where they will be grouped together and getting the de-radicalization program from the French government such as Fleury-Merogis, Lille-Annoeullin, Osny and two in Fresnes (leparisien, 2015).

### 2.6.2. Focusing on prevention of radicalization

France has to prepare all efforts to strengthen the prevention of radicalization (those who have not yet been radicalized). The measures were giving additional € 60 million for radicalization prevention funds for a period of three years; conducting internet socialization of French society especially the teenagers about methods to combat the recruitment of jihadists; strengthening internet network control and online violation investigations that impersonate communication and jihadist activities; and increasing cyber patrol (Gouvernement France, 2017).

Moreover, the government also focused on the plan on combating violent radicalism with measures such as launching the Toll-free service number '0800005696' launched in 2014 which aims to prevent the process of radicalization and recruitment of jihadists around the French community; provision of forms for reporting every move on issues surrounding terrorism; inter-ministerial prevention worker training under the Ministry of Interior for ministries in France in socializing the problem of terrorism and how to prevent it; and launching the website 'Stop.djihadisme.gouv.fr' which is intended for all groups that aim to provide an understanding of the problems and means of the fight against terrorism to understand actors in the scope of terrorism, react to threats that are in sight, understand every propaganda used by jihadists and mobilize reactions in threat situations in everyday life.

### 2.6.3. Closing the radical mosques

Since the terror attacks in 2015 up until August 2016, the French government has closed at least 20 mosques and prayer rooms for Muslims who are considered to have spread radical ideas (Gouvernement France, 2017).

## 2.7. Reinforcing Secularism Value among French Society

In the face of terror attacks since 2015, the French Government has strengthened their understanding about secularism which is started from schools in France (McPartland, 2016). The school has become their first priority since the government realizes a cultural rift between immigrant offspring which leads to the phenomenon of radicalization and in addition to that the government aims to reduce social vulnerability that might support radicalization (Senate of France, 2018; Gouvernement France, 2017). In this case, each teacher gets training and all students get learning about citizenship and moral values including singing the national anthem, 'La Marseillaise' in every class. In supporting this program, the government allocated € 71 million or \$ 80 million in 2015 and \$ 250 million for three years' period (Baume, 2015).

## 2.8. Countering Terrorist Financing

The post-January attack in 2015, there has been an increase in finances as the French Prime Minister stated. With € 5 million allocated for equipment purchases

and special maintenance in combating terrorism and its financing and the addition of 70 agents for placement in Customs and 10 additional agents for a 3-year period, these measures are expected to maximize France's efforts in fighting terrorism (Senate of France, 2018). Furthermore, Michel Sapin and Bernard Cazeneuve, as Minister of Finance and French Minister of Interior, have decided to strengthen the cooperation of intelligence services in an effort to target more specifically the flow and financial movements that are likely to finance terrorist networks in France.

On March 2015, the French Minister of Finance explained the steps in eradicating terrorism funding which focus was divided into:

- *Identification*; it is necessary to return anonymity in the economy in an effort to increase the tracking of suspicious transactions.
- *Surveillance*; it is necessary to increase due diligence on financial stakeholders in fighting terrorism.
- *Action*; the need for capacity support to freeze assets owned by funders and terrorism players.

## **2.9. French Contribution to the Global Level**

Contribution to the global level as their efforts in counter-terrorism is part of their mission in order to eradicate the problem of terrorism from its roots. In order to achieve the goal, France's contribution to the problem of terrorism at the global level involves several elements. In term of conducting a military operation, Opération Barkhane and Opération Chammal are two main operations of France as their efforts in countering terrorism at the global level (Garamone, 2017).

In addition to the military movements launched by France in fighting terrorism, France also plays their diplomacy role in helping countries that enter into the categorization of France as a weak and related country with Radical Islamic Organizations such as Syria, Iraq and in Sahel region. This includes reaching the stabilization and political solution which aims to be another solution in combating the movements of terrorist groups (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2019). France also has contributed along with the EU in reinforcing European security.

### **2.9.1. Opération Barkhane**

On August 1, 2014, France launched the Opération Barkhane as a continuation of the Serval operation, in an effort to ensure the security of countries in the Sahel region and as well as to protect French interests (Larivé, 2014). The Opération Barkhane is based on a partnership approach with Sahel-Saharan countries incorporated in 5G countries (Burkina-Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) in an effort to encourage 5G partner countries in the fight against terrorist groups (Ministère des Armées, 2018).

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


Figure 3. Mapping French Opération Barkhane in Sahel Region (Ministère des Armées, 2018)

2.9.2. Opération Chammal

Opération Chammal is a form of global coalition in term of join forces against Radical Islamic Organizations like ISIS, holding by French military operation (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2019). On September 19, 2014, was the beginning of launching Operation Chammal which was assisting the airspace to the Iraqi armed forces. In order to support the Iraqi government and intended to carry out the forces moving on the ground against ISIS and to attack the military capabilities of in combating terrorist group (Ministère des Armées, 2018).




Figure 4. Map of Opération Chammal and its Deployment (Ministère des Armées, 2018)

Opération Chammal has two missions which complement each other; first is on air force about the missions on airstrikes and intelligence, and the second one is on exercise regarding advice for Iraqi national security armed forces and Peshmerga (Ministère des Armées, 2016).

### **3. Conclusion**

The entry of the 21st century has been marked by an increase in international terrorism under the guise of religion that has developed in France. This has been compounded since the declaration of ISIS in June 2014, where the existence of ISIS has remained to date, the problem of religious terrorism has modified to the specific term which is Jihadist/Islamist terrorism. The formation of ISIS caliphate also remains that France is facing a serious threat from Jihadist/Islamist terrorism both from the group itself and from the lone actors who get the inspiration from that Jihadist/Islamist groups. The attacks that have been conducted have made the movement of ISIS beyond France's control which made the issue one of France's security priority.

Therefore, through various acts of terror that have occurred in France, securitization acts which were taken by France is in line with the concept of French national security in which the purpose of national security for France is to be able to make France a state that is free from all existing risks and threats that can endanger the lives of their people, both direct or indirect. In doing so, France has started their securitization acts by declaring the state of emergency status for France in which gives the freedom for the security authority in conducting their patrols. Besides, France also has adopted new six laws, conducted internal operation known as French Operation Sentinelle, reinforced secularism values in France and conducted international actions such as Operation Barkhane and Operation Chammal as their international actions to fight global terrorism. These efforts are taken to respond to terrorist threats which threaten their national security. However, it must be highlighted that to this date, France's securitization efforts, especially during Hollande, did not become a barrier for ISIS militants in launching their actions in France as we might refer to the frequent terror attacks that have been conducted up until now.

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